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Abstract
Although norovirus is a signiﬁcant cause of nosocomial viral gastroenteritis, the economic value of hospital outbreak containment mea-
sures following identiﬁcation of a norovirus case is currently unknown. We developed computer simulation models to determine the
potential cost-savings from the hospital perspective of implementing the following norovirus outbreak control interventions: (i)
increased hand hygiene measures, (ii) enhanced disinfection practices, (iii) patient isolation, (iv) use of protective apparel, (v) staff exclu-
sion policies, and (vi) ward closure. Sensitivity analyses explored the impact of varying intervention efﬁcacy, number of initial norovirus
cases, the norovirus reproductive rate (R0), and room, ward size, and occupancy. Implementing increased hand hygiene, using protective
apparel, staff exclusion policies or increased disinfection separately or in bundles provided net cost-savings, even when the intervention
was only 10% effective in preventing further norovirus transmission. Patient isolation or ward closure was cost-saving only when trans-
mission prevention efﬁcacy was very high (‡90%), and their economic value decreased as the number of beds per room and the number
of empty beds per ward increased. Increased hand hygiene, using protective apparel or increased disinfection practices separately or in
bundles are the most cost-saving interventions for the control and containment of a norovirus outbreak.
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Introduction
Norovirus has continued to be a threat in the community
and in health care settings [1–4]. Norovirus is highly infec-
tious and can spread rapidly in health care settings, consum-
ing resources and resulting in longer hospital stays [5–8].
The average cost of a microbiologically conﬁrmed nosoco-
mial infection in the United States is estimated to be over
$15 000 [9]. A 2007 norovirus outbreak at Johns Hopkins
Hospital, a 946-bed hospital, cost an estimated $650 000 [2].
A 2003 outbreak cost a Swiss hospital $40 675 [10]. Out-
breaks in the United Kingdom have been estimated to cost
$1 million per 1000 hospital beds in 2002–2003 and cost the
National Health Service (NHS) an estimated £1 billion annu-
ally [3].
Promptly identifying and preventing the spread of a norovi-
rus outbreak may be keys to minimizing its impact. Health care
facility administrators and infection control specialists have sev-
eral containment interventions at their disposal including: (i)
enhanced hand hygiene measures, (ii) contact isolation with
protective apparel, (iii) isolation or cohorting of infected
patients and staff, (iv) modiﬁed staff policies to exclude staff
from work and prohibit exposed staff from working in unex-
posed areas, (v) modiﬁed visitor policies, (vi) enhanced disinfec-
tion practices through increased cleaning of wards and
bathrooms, (vii) education of health care workers regarding
identiﬁcation of norovirus enhanced outbreak control mea-
sures, and (viii) active surveillance of the outbreak. Each of
these interventions have associated costs, such as an increase in
hygiene, protective and disinfection materials, reduction in
number of available beds, and loss of staff time and productivity.
Deciding whether to implement various norovirus detec-
tion and control measures depends on the balance
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between the costs of implementation and the potential
cost-savings from each measure. To better understand this
balance, we developed a computer simulation model that
simulated the decision regarding whether to perform such
strategies. Sensitivity analyses varied model parameters and
allowed us to delineate how the cost-beneﬁt of each strat-
egy may vary by initial norovirus outbreak size, prevention
strategy efﬁcacy, and strategy cost. The results of our
model may help guide policy making and the design of
future clinical studies.
Methods
General model structure
Using TreeAge Pro Suite 2009 (TreeAge Software, Williams-
town, MA, USA), which included Microsoft Excel (Microsoft
Corporation, Redmond, WA, USA), we developed a stochas-
tic, Monte Carlo decision analytical computer simulation
model with dynamic transmission elements that simulated
the decision regarding whether to implement a norovirus
containment intervention. Fig. 1 outlines the model and the
steps that follow the appearance of n primary norovirus
cases (base case, 1) in a hospital ward. When no interven-
tion was implemented, each infected primary case generated
R0 additional secondary cases, with R0 being the reproductive
rate (i.e. the expected number of new cases generated by a
single infectious individual upon entering a fully susceptible
population) [11]. Alternatively, implementing containment
interventions reduced transmission (i.e. decreased R0) pro-
portional to the intervention’s efﬁcacy [effective reproductive
rate Re = R0*(1 ) intervention efﬁcacy)], which reﬂected the
combination of the inherent efﬁcacy of the intervention and
compliance with the intervention. For example, if R0 had a
mean of 3.74 (range, 3.179–4.301), an intervention with an
efﬁcacy of 50% reduced R0 by 50% to 1.87 (range, 1.59–
2.15).
Each primary and secondary patient had a probability of
being symptomatic or asymptomatic. Symptomatic patients
experienced an increased length-of-stay (LOS), based on
published studies (Table 1). This increased LOS resulted in
occupied bed days that could have been used for other
patients. A method described by Graves [12] translated
these lost bed-days to opportunity costs. Asymptomatic
patients did not experience increases in LOS but could trans-
mit the virus. Each additional secondary case added cost
based on their increased LOS. The model considered costs
of only primary and secondary cases.
Decision analyzed:
Implement containment
intervention
-or-
Do not implement
containment intervention
Detection of
n primary cases
Start intervention*
If intervention:If no intervention:
Each primary case generates
R0 (reproductive rate)
new secondary cases
Each primary case generates
R0 × (1-intervention efficacy)
new secondary cases
Total cost =
cost of primary and secondary
symptomatic cases
(due to length of stay)
*Interventions:
Increased hand hygiene
Enhance protective apparel 
Increased disinfection
Staff exclusion polices
Patient isolation
Ward closure
Total cost =
cost of primary and secondary
symptomatic cases (due to length of stay)
+ cost of intervention
FIG. 1. Containment intervention strat-
egy diagram.
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Interventions
Based on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s
(CDC) recently published guidelines [13], the interventions
we modelled were: (i) increased hand hygiene with soap,
water and/or alcohol, (ii) enhanced use of protective apparel,
including gloves, gowns and masks with each patient contact,
(iii) increased disinfection of the ward, (iv) staff exclusion
policies, where ill staff were excluded from the workplace
for an additional 2 days after symptoms resolved, increasing
the nurse to patient ratio of the remaining staff, (v) patient
isolation, where sick patients had a room to themselves, and
(vi) ward closure, in which the ward halted new admissions.
To compare strategies, we compared the distribution of
incremental cost of implementing the prevention strategy vs.
not implementing the strategy:
Total costImplementing containment strategy
Total costNot implementing containment strategy
Additional analyses examined how this incremental cost var-
ied with the number of base cases, prevention efﬁcacy, R0
and containment measure costs.
Data inputs
Table 1 shows the model input variables and distributions.
All probabilities drew from beta distributions, all costs from
gamma distributions, and all others from triangular distribu-
tions. The probability of a case being symptomatic came
from challenge studies [6,14].
The cost of each intervention was as follows:
• Increasing hand hygiene: the mean cost was $0.4341 per
day (standard deviation 0.168) and included the cost of paper
towels, soap and alcohol.
• Enhanced protective apparel: the mean cost was $39.55
per patient contact and included the costs of gloves, gowns
and masks.
• Increased disinfection: the mean cost was $15.93 per day
(range, $11.45–$26.39) accounting for custodial wages.
• Staff exclusion policies: the mean cost was $674.84 and
included the cost of nurse wages (average $30.93 per hour)
for the duration of their illness plus 2 days (to account for
viral shedding) and the increased nurse-patient ratio of
remaining staff (average 0.227 per remaining staff).
• Patient isolation: the mean cost was $3484 for one empty
bed and was derived from the cost of a bed day ($1742)
multiplied by the LOS, accounting for the size of a patient’s
room (having one, two or three additional empty beds).
• Ward closure: the mean cost was $3484 for one empty
bed and was calculated by multiplying the number of empty
beds in the closed ward by the cost per bed day and the
patient’s LOS.
Sensitivity analyses
Because the efﬁcacy of certain interventions has not been
clearly established and may vary under different circum-
stances (e.g. compliance), sensitivity analyses explored the
effects of ranging each intervention’s efﬁcacy from 10% to
90%. The intervention’s efﬁcacy is the proportion of norovi-
rus transmission that the intervention reduces. The efﬁcacy
is a function of the intervention’s inherent ability to reduce
transmission, implement intensity and staff compliance. Sensi-
tivity analyses also varied the values of the following vari-
ables: number of primary cases (range, 1–5), individual room
size (range, 2–4 beds), number of empty beds in a closed
ward (range, 1–5 beds), and R0 (low R0 [15] range, 3.179–
4.301; high R0 [16] range, 5.26–9.25). At a low R0, an infec-
tious person could generate 3.179–4.301 additional norovirus
cases. Furthermore, each simulation run consisted of proba-
bilistic sensitivity analyses, which simultaneously varied all
input parameters over the ranges listed in Table 1.
Results
Each simulation run involved 1 000 000 realizations, each
introducing n primary cases to a hospital ward to create an
outbreak of primary and secondary cases. Table 2 shows the
cost of each intervention strategy (compared with no inter-
vention) after a single primary case and low R0 (3.179–
4.301). All reported negative cost values imply cost-savings
to the hospital and all positive cost values indicate a net
expenditure.
TABLE 1. Data inputs for model variables
Description (units) Mean
Standard
deviation
95%
range Source
Costs ($US)
Bed day 1,742 – – [19]
Paper towels per bed day 0.277 0.136 – [20]
Soap per bed day 0.106 0.077 – [20]
Alcohol per bed day 0.051 0.046 – [20]
Gloves, gown and mask 1.56 – – [21,22]
Wages ($US)
Registered nurse per hour 30.93 – 21.50, 45.68 [23]
Custodian per hour 10.62 – 7.63, 17.59 [23]
Durations
Increased length of
stay (days)
2.00 – 0.96, 13.05 [6,7,24–30]
Numbers
Reproductive rate (high) 7.26 – 5.26, 9.25 [16]
Reproductive rate (low) 3.74 – 3.179, 4.301 [15]
Patient contacts per day 38 – 25, 50 [21]
Patient per nurse ratio 4.4 2.9 – [31]
Probabilities
Asymptomatic infection 0.33711 0.02833 – [6,14]
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Unmitigated norovirus outbreak
Initial simulation runs determined the cost of a norovirus
case (symptomatic or asymptomatic) to the hospital: mean
$6237, standard deviation $3211. Costs arose from the
increased LOS from symptomatic cases that translated to
lost hospital bed days.
Increased hand hygiene
Table 2 shows that increased hand hygiene yielded net cost-
savings for all scenarios, for example increasing hand hygiene
after detecting one primary case yielded costs of )$2336
(10% efﬁcacy) to )$21 394 (90% efﬁcacy). Savings increased
with the number of primary cases and intervention efﬁcacy.
In an outbreak with ﬁve primary cases, costs ranged from
)$11 464 (10% efﬁcacy) to )$104 273 (90% efﬁcacy). With
higher R0 (5.26–9.25), increasing hand hygiene after one pri-
mary case showed cost-savings ranging from )$4539 (10%
intervention efﬁcacy) to )$39 748 (90% efﬁcacy).
Enhanced use of protective apparel
Enhanced protective apparel use was cost-saving for all sce-
narios. With more primary cases and increased intervention
efﬁcacy, costs decreased ()$103 248 at 90% efﬁcacy and ﬁve
initial cases). A higher R0 yielded costs between )$4134
(10% efﬁcacy) and )$40 129 (90% efﬁcacy) for one primary
case.
Increased disinfection
Increased disinfection was cost-saving (i.e. negative costs) as
long as efﬁcacy was ‡10% when there was a single primary
case. With ﬁve primary cases, increased disinfection cost
)$11 085 (10% efﬁcacy) to )$99 363 (90% efﬁcacy).
Increased disinfection manifested even greater cost-savings
with a higher R0 (cost-savings were as large as )$40 040 at
90% efﬁcacy for one primary case).
Staff exclusion policies
Table 2 demonstrates that staff exclusion policies also
yielded cost-savings throughout almost every scenario. With
one primary case and low R0 (3.179–4.301), staff exclusion
policies with 20% efﬁcacy cost )$2460. Cost-savings grew as
the number of primary cases and staff exclusion efﬁcacy
increased. Also, increasing R0 lowered the efﬁcacy threshold
at which such policies were cost-saving; that is, with one pri-
mary case, costs of implementing staff exclusion ranged from
)$2096 (10% efﬁcacy) to )$38 410 (90% efﬁcacy).
Patient isolation
Patient isolation resulted in net hospital cost-savings under
certain conditions. Assuming two beds per room and one
primary case, patient isolation yielded cost-savings for all low
and high R0 scenarios when isolation efﬁcacy was ‡50%.
However, as the numbers of primary cases or beds per
TABLE 2. Cost ($US, mean and standard deviation) of intervention strategies (individual and bundled) compared with no
intervention for one base case at a low reproductive rate. Grey shading values are cost-savings
Intervention efﬁcacy (%)a
10 30 50 70 90
Intervention
Increased hand hygiene )2336 (1209) )6971 (3628) )11 760 (6124) )16 353 (8580) )21 394 (11 667)
Enhanced protective apparel )1991 (1208) )6606 (3581) )11 446 (6033) )15 934 (8806) )20 454 (10 500)
Increased disinfection )2236 (1199) )6820 (3698) )11 844 (6260) )15 955 (8321) )20 481 (10 545)
Staff exclusion policies 10 (3254) )4361 (7261) )9585 (6823) )13 862 (8942) )18 608 (11 407)
Patient isolation
Two beds per room 7018 (4886) 2417 (6070) )2287 (8140) )6451 (9646) )10 968 (11 720)
Three beds per room 16 570 (10 108) 12 223 (10 669) 7545 (11 350) 2700 (12 795) )1976 (14 863)
Four beds per room 26 724 (14 672) 21 952 (15 531) 17 613 (15 647) 13 268 (16 722) 8568 (18 817)
Ward closure
One empty bed 7322 (5089) 2352 (5894) )2137 (7795) )6930 (9532) )10 894 (11 636)
Three empty beds 26 592 (14 676) 21 600 (15 077) 17 519 (16 542) 11 439 (16 773) 8201 (17 736)
Five empty beds 46 166 (24 263) 40 069 (24 232) 35 699 (25 094) 32 030 (26 714) 27 142 (27 149)
Bundled interventions
Increased hand hygiene + enhanced protective
apparel + increased disinfection
)1958 )6573 )11 413 )15 901 )20 421
Increased hand hygiene + enhanced protective
apparel + increased disinfection + staff
exclusion policies
121 )4249 )9473 )13 750 )18 496
Staff exclusion policies + increased disinfection 42 )4329 )9553 )13 830 )18 576
Patient isolation (two beds) + increased disinfection 7050 2449 )2255 )6419 )10 666
Patient isolation (two beds) + staff exclusion policies 7693 3092 )1612 )7126 )10 293
Patient isolation (four beds) + increased disinfection 26 756 21 983 17 645 13 300 8600
Patient isolation (four beds) + staff exclusion policies 27 399 22 627 18 289 13 943 9243
Ward closure (one empty bed) + increased disinfection 7354 2384 )2105 )6898 )10 862
Ward closure (three empty beds) + increased disinfection 26 624 21 632 17 551 11 471 8233
Ward closure (ﬁve empty beds) + increased disinfection 46 198 40 101 35 731 32 062 27 174
aComposite of inherent intervention efﬁcacy and compliance with intervention.
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room increased, so did net costs. Isolation with three beds
per room had a net cost (i.e. expenditure) to the hospital as
long as efﬁcacy was <90% regardless of the number of pri-
mary cases. With four beds per room, patient isolation was
never cost-saving, with costs ranging from $26 724 (10% efﬁ-
cacy) to $8568 (90% efﬁcacy). Increasing R0 lowered net
costs and the thresholds at which patient isolation became
cost-saving, for example with two beds per room for all
tested base cases, patient isolation with 30% efﬁcacy cost
)$4083. With three beds per room, patient isolation became
cost-saving at 50% efﬁcacy, and with four beds per room it
became cost-saving at an efﬁcacy ‡70%. Fig. 2 shows the
costs of implementing this intervention after detecting one
case. Each line represents the costs for a speciﬁc room size
at low and high R0s and highlights how costs change as beds
per room and isolation efﬁcacy change. Net hospital costs
persist until patient isolation becomes ‡20% efﬁcacious, at
which point patient isolation in a two-bed room and low R0
is cost-saving.
Ward closure
Ward closure generated net costs for a majority of scenarios
explored. Because each empty bed in a closed ward repre-
sents opportunity cost to the hospital, ward closure cost
increased as the number of empty beds increased. Fig. 3
shows how the value of ward closure increased as efﬁcacy
increased. The bands show how ward closure’s economic
value varied with R0. The differently shaded bands indicate
how the cost increased with number of empty beds. For
example, with low R0, one empty bed per ward, and ward
closure initiated as soon as a single case appeared, ward clo-
sure was only cost-saving when efﬁcacy exceeded 50%. This
efﬁcacy threshold decreased somewhat when R0 increased.
Increasing the number of empty beds per ward to three
increased hospital costs by as much as $25 592 (10% ward
closure efﬁcacy). In general, ward closure was cost-saving
only when there were no more than three empty beds.
Combined interventions
Table 2 also shows the economic effects of different combi-
nations (i.e. bundles) of interventions and their variation with
bundle efﬁcacy (i.e. efﬁcacy of the entire bundle together;
individual strategy efﬁcacies within the bundle can vary). The
bundles that did not include patient isolation or ward closure
were all cost-saving. Patient isolation bundles (two beds per
room) were not cost-saving at 40% efﬁcacy but became
cost-saving when intervention efﬁcacy was ‡50%. Patient iso-
lation bundles (four beds per room) were not cost-saving at
any efﬁcacy. Ward closure plus increased disinfection with
one empty bed only became cost-saving at ‡50% efﬁcacy. All
other bundles with ward closure were not cost-saving.
Discussion
Our results indicate that increasing hand hygiene, using pro-
tective apparel, instituting staff exclusion policies, and
increasing disinfection practices are all cost-saving nosoco-
mial norovirus outbreak control measures. In other words,
implementing one of these strategies may actually save
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hospitals money, even when intervention efﬁcacy is not very
high. This is important because baseline efﬁcacies for
different interventions may vary by institution. For example,
baseline rates for hand hygiene between 1977 and 2008 have
been found to range from 6.3% to 62% [17].
By contrast, ward closure and patient isolation incurred
net costs in many situations. Both interventions appear to be
widely used; a systemic review found the ward closure rate
for norovirus to be 44.1% [18]. Closing a ward leads to
opportunity costs (i.e. lost potential revenue), which grow as
the overall ward size and, in turn, number of empty beds
increases. Zingg et al. [10] also reported that ward closures
had the greatest impact on hospital resources. Ward closure
would only be cost-saving at much higher R0s. Ward closure
cost may be prohibitive for a hospital, unless it occurs
promptly after a single case is detected.
With different norovirus control measures available, deci-
sion makers may need to better understand the economic
trade-offs. Because intervention efﬁcacy and compliance may
vary by circumstances and location, the goal of our study
was not to dictate which policy to use but to show how the
economic impact of each intervention may vary by different
circumstances (e.g. efﬁcacy/compliance, norovirus transmissi-
bility, ward size and bed availability).
Limitations
Every computer model is a simpliﬁcation of real life. No
model can fully represent every event and outcome that may
ensue from norovirus illness or exposure. For example, hos-
pitalized patients with cardiovascular, renal or autoimmune
disorders may have an increased illness duration. Also, our
model focused on primary and secondary cases and did
not include tertiary cases. All of these simpliﬁcations could
underestimate the cost-savings of norovirus prevention
strategies.
Conclusions and future directions
Implementing increased hand hygiene, using protective appa-
rel, increased disinfection practices or staff exclusion policies
for the control and containment of a norovirus outbreak
may provide cost-savings to hospitals. Using these strategies
in conjunction with each other could maximize the effects of
controlling an outbreak. Patient isolation and ward closure
may be more costly, especially when not implemented early.
Future studies may better elucidate the efﬁcacy of these
interventions. Decision makers, including policy makers, hos-
pital administrators and infection control professionals, can
then compare these efﬁcacies with the benchmarks from our
study in order to implement the optimal interventions for
their local circumstances.
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